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ANTI-COMBINES ADMINISTRATION
DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTI-COMBINES
ADMINISTRATION
A. A. FATOUROSt
The Canadian legislation on combines and monopolies is now
almost seventy-five years old. The first Act "for the prevention and
suppression of combinations formed in restraint of trade" was
passed in 1889 but its amended language is still to be found in the
central provisions of the Combines Investigation Act presently in
force.1 Over the years, there have been no doubt several changes in
the structure and language of the Act, but the original policies are
still very much alive. The Act's enforcement has been, at best, spotty;
it is only since 1952 that the public has become aware of the Act
and its exact role in the Canadian economy is still uncertain and
undefined. As a contribution to a future appraisal and clarification,
the present article attempts to examine and interpret some of the
more recent developments in the administration of the Act.
The Combines Investigation Act in the 'Fifties
The administration of the Act in the Nineteen Fifties has been
the subject of a valuable recent study by Professors Rosenbluth and
Thorburn. 2 After a penetrating description of the economic and
political background of the 1952 amendments to the Act, the authors
devote the central part of their study to an examination of the actual
results of these amendments. How effective has the Act been in
achieving its aims? It is the impression of many students in this field
that the Act's real effectiveness is very limited.A Rosenbluth and
Thorbum now provide some concrete data to confirm these im-
pressions.
They first point at the low level of governmental appropriations
devoted to the anti-combines administration as a clear indication of
its low level of priority. After 1952, the expenditures of the Combines
t A. A. Fatouros, U. Dipl., M.C.L., LL.M., J.S.D. Visiting Assistant Professor, University
of Chicago Law SchooL
1 CAN. REv. STAT. c. 314 (1952), as amended, especially by STAT. CAN. C. 45 (1960).
2 ROSENBLUTIH AND THORBURN, CANADIAN ANTI-ComBNEms ArDINISTRATION 1952-1960 (1963)(hereinafter cited as ROsNBLuTH AND THoRnmN). For a more detailed discussion and
appraisal, see Fatouros, Book-review, 42 CAN. B. REV. (1964).
2A See, e.g., for some recent statements, Kilgour, Restrictive Trade Practices, 4 CAN. BJ.
1141, 122 and passlm (1961); Brecher, Combines and Competition: A Re-Appraisal of
Canadian Public Policy, 38 CAN. B. Rev. 523, 529-530 (1960).
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Branch increased considerably, but there has been no significant
increase, in absolute or in relative terms, since 1954. In fact, the
proportion of the total non-military budget allotted to anti-combines
activity has been declining rather than increasing most of the time.
The actual effect of anti-combines legislation on the Canadian
economy is difficult to determine with precision. Close analysis of
the activities of the Combines Branch has convinced Professors
Rosenbluth and Thorburn that the Act's effectiveness is very limited.
Their argumentation could have been perhaps more detailed and
therefore more convincing, 3 but it is difficult to dispute the validity
of their conclusion.
What is the reason for this lack of effectiveness? Rosenbluth and
Thorbum offer a number of explanations, though they do not pre-
tend to give a final and exhaustive answer. They point out that, in
periods of general prosperity, monopolistic situations are not greatly
resented by the public and the enforcement of anti-combines legisla-
tion tends to be unenthusiastic and ineffective, often limited to a
few nominal gestures. Emergencies and crises, however, stimulate
public feeling and governmental action against monopolistic situa-
tions. The authors show, for instance, that the ban on resale price
maintenance in 1951 was intended in major part as a move against
inflation. 4 Basically, then, it is the lack of enthusiasm of the govern-
ment that renders the Combines Investigation Act ineffective.
There is, however, another cause which Rosenbluth and Thor-
burn particularly stress:5 the Government and the civil servants ad-
ministering the Act work on the basis of a "cops and robbers" con-
ception of the law of restrictive trade practices, an approach based
on criminal law. Instead of treating the businessmen's tendency
toward restricting competition as a natural tendency which needs to
be checked, they insist on acting as if only a few criminal elements
will ever attempt to attain a monopoly position or to restrict com-
petition. Such a conception leads the Combines Branch to the neglect
of research not directed against specific "suspect" situations; 6 it leads
3 See ROSENBLUT AND THORBuRN 57-83. Table VIIC, certainly the most important and
the one needing most clarification, is commented upon in two pages (78-79). Still, even
as an "educated guess", Professor Rosenbluth's findings are authoritative; c, ROSEN-
BLUTH, CONCENTRATION IN CANADIAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (1956); Rosenbluth,
Concentration and Monopoly In the Canadian Economy, in SOCIAL PURPOSE FOR CANADA
198 (M. Oliver ed. 1961).
4 RosENBLrr AND THoRBtN 99.
5 Id. at 29-32, 101-103.
6 Under the present conditions, research undertaken by the Combines Branch is often
strongly resented by the business community, despite the Branch's assurance as to the
lack of any intention to base prosecutions on it. The reaction to the recent research on
mergers is characteristic. See The Globe & Mail, Nov. 27, 1961, p. 26.
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the courts to a refusal to convict where there is the slightest "reason-
able doubt" and, less openly, to a reluctance to impose criminal
penalties on respectable businessmen. Businessmen, too, find that
the imposition of criminal penalties for business actions, often done
on proper legal advice, is "unfair"; it rankles on their self-respect
to be treated as criminals, subject to possible imprisonment (even
if no one in Canada has ever gone to prison yet for price-fixing or
monopolizing.)7
The basic validity of this argument cannot be contested, even
though it is surely incorrect to say that those in charge of the ad-
ministration of the Act are not aware of it. Still, the criminal law
character of the anti-combines legislation does limit the effectiveness
of its enforcement on psychological grounds as well as by limiting
the number and kind of measures that can be employed. But there
is here a fundamental legal problem which a mere change of attitude
(at least if it does not extend to the courts) is not going to solve.
As Professor Rosenbluth and Thorbum are aware,8 anti-combines
legislation is at present enacted by the Dominion Parliament by
virtue of its criminal law jurisdiction, not its power to regulate trade
and commerce. 9 After the abortive legislation of 1919 and 1935,10
there has been no attempt to found the Act on the federal trade and
commerce jurisdiction. The successive Cabinets and their majorities
(or minorities) in Parliament have shown a marked reluctance to
attack this problem, probably because of lack of awareness of its
importance, because of fear of possible political complications and
also because of a certain lack of legislative ingenuity. For a certain
amount of ingenuity is needed in order to act effectively in this field.
It cannot be realistically expected that the Supreme Court of Canada,
despite its present more favourable attitude toward the use of the
trade and commerce clause, 1' will directly overrule its own and
the Privy Council's precedents. A method will have to be devised
whereby the anti-combines administrative machinery will be given
7 The only case of imprisonment in connection with anti-combines activity seems to have
been Re Singer (1929), 37 Ont. Weekly N. 3. This was a case of commitment for con-
tempt because of persistent refusal to comply with orders of the Commissioner.
8 Cf. RosENBLuTr AND THORBURN 5, 6 and 104.
9 That is, under § 91 (27) of the B.N.A. Act and not under § 91 (2). And cf. LAsKr,CANADIAN CONSTTTONAL LAW 306-314, 428, 823-827 (2nd ed. 1960); GossE, THE LAW
ON COMPE)TIION IN CANADA 236-239 (1962). And see now, A. S TrrH, TE COMMERcE
POWER IN CANADA AND TrI UNITED STATES 100-109, 143-147 (1963).
10 Cf. In re the Board of Commerce Act, 1919, and the Combines and Fair Practices Act,
1919 (1921), [1922" 1 A.C. 191 (P.C.); Reference re Dominion Trade and Industry
Commission Act, 1935, [1936 Can. Sup. Ct. 379, [1936] 3 D.L.R. 607. Cf. note 9 supra.
The political background of the 1935 legislation has been recenty analyzed by D. F.
Forster, The Politics of Combines Poliy: Lierals and the Stevens Commissin, 28 CAN.e. EcoN. POL. Se. 511 (1962).
11 Cf. I.SKIUN, op. cit. supra note 9, at 314-318; GOSSE, op. cit. supra note 9, at 261, 264-266; rrH, . at 157 181.
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some regulatory power, but a method sufficiently different from those
employed in 1919 and 1935 to permit the courts to hold the legisla-
tion intra vires the Dominion Parliament. The search for such a
solution would seem to be a proper subject for interdisciplinary
research.
The 1960 Amendments-Combinations
The far-reaching amendments to the Combines Investigation Act
enacted in 196012 changed its whole appearance, and to some extent
its substance, but did not show any radical change in Parliament's
approach to the problems of restrictive trade practices. The changes
to the Act are of many kinds. Some of them are certainly improve-
ments; this is true, for instance, of the consolidation of the legislation
and of the new section 41A (Exchequer Court jurisdiction), even if
the latter does not go far enough. The changes in the definition of
mergers and monopolies (section 2(e) and (f)) also belong to this
category. Other amendments do not seem to really change anything,
as, for instance, the moving of the definition of "combine" from
section 2(a) to section 32(1).13 In some cases, new offences (relat-
ing to "unfair" rather than "restrictive" trade practices) have been
imported; thus, section 33B is directed against discrimination in the
granting of promotional allowances and section 33C against some
types of misleading advertising.14 Finally, some amendments appear
to lead to a lessening of the effectiveness of the Act by providing
defences to those charged with combining to unduly limit competition
(section 32) or with resale price maintenance (section 34).
Section 32 contains, in subsection (1), the Act's best known
and most used provision, prohibiting any "combination" or other
arrangement calculated to unduly limit or lessen competition. The
four subsections added in 1960 provide certain defences against a
charge under this section and exempt certain combinations from its
application. The exemptions (section 32(4) and (5)) need not con-
cern us at any length. They relate to combinations directed to the
export market which are permitted, unless they result in a reduction
of exports, injure domestic competitors or restrict entry into the
particular industry, or have lessened or are likely to lessen unduly
competition in the domestic market. It does not appear that Canadian
exporters are hastening to take advantage of the exemption. One
12 STAT. CAN., c. 45, (1960).
13 The description of this change in ROSENBLUTH AND THoRBURN 92-93 is somewhat mis-
leading; the authors seem to imply that the new § 32 (1) is significantly different from
the previous § 32 (which, of course, had to be read in conjunction with § 2 (a)).
14 See infra note 45.
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combination, relating to the export of fruit and vegetable products,
has been reported formed, but there is no way of knowing whether
any others have been set up, because the Act imposes no require-
ment of disclosure or registration. It remains problematical whether,
in the long run, the operation of export combinations can leave the
domestic market wholly unaffected.
The defences provided by subsection (2) apply to all prosecu-
tions under section 32 and are of far greater importance. It is provided
that an accused will not be convicted if it is proven that the combina-
tion related to
(a) the exchange of statistics,
(b) the defining of product standards,
(c) the exchange of credit information,
(d) definition of trade terms,
(e) co-operation in research and development,
(f) restriction of advertising, or
(g) some other matter not enumerated in subsection (3).
This subsection is importantly qualified by subsection (3), ac-
cording to which:
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if the conspiracy, combination, agree-
ment or arrangement has lessened or is likely to lessen competition
unduly in respect of one of the following:
(a) prices,
(b) quantity, or quality of production,
(c) markets or customers, or
(d) channels or methods of distribution, or if the conspiracy, com-
bination, agreement or arrangement has restricted or is likely to
restrict any person from entering into or expanding a business in
a trade or industry.
The precise effect of these amendments is not clear and, at the
time of writing, they have not yet been considered by the courts.
The express intention of the legislature was to "clarify" the scope of
the general prohibition of combinations, but it is very likely that, in
so doing, it has weakened it, as well. The uncertainty of the general
provision, of which business circles had complained, has been re-
placed by uncertainty as to the meaning and extent of the defences.15
There can be little doubt that, when in good faith, the practices
enumerated in subsection (2) would not lessen or prevent competi-
tion unduly. This in itself would have been a good defence even
15 The suggestion that specific defences be included in the Act had been expressly rejected
by the MacQuarrie Committee; cf. REPoItT oF THE Com~mrrre To STUDY COMBINES
LEOISLATION 45-46 (1952). And cf. RoSENBLUn AND THORxusRN 93; M. Cohen, Towards
Reconsideration in Anti-Combines Law and Policy, 9 McGrLL L. J. 81, 94 (1963).
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before 1960. On the other hand, many of these practices can be used
in bad faith to cover transactions which in reality tend to limit com-
petition. No doubt, subsection (3) would apply in such a case, but it
seems that a heavier burden of proof is now laid on the prosecution. 6
An indication to this effect may also be gathered by comparing
the language of subsection (3) to that of subsection (1). The latter
refers to an agreement or conspiracy to lessen competition unduly
and it has been established by the courts that if the existence and
the content of the agreement itself are proved, there is no need to
prove further that the agreement has been carried into effect suc-
cessfully.17 The Crown has then a choice of either proving the intent
of the parties directly, by producing the agreement, or proving it
indirectly, by showing that a course of action has been followed which
constitutes evidence of the parties' intent. The 1960 amendments
may have changed this situation. Once subsection (2) has been in-
yoked and subsection (3) called upon to defeat it, the latter would
be controlling. And there is no reference in it to intent per se; a
more objective standard is used instead, namely whether the arrange-
ment "has lessened or is likely to lessen competition unduly." Where,
therefore, an agreement has been concluded under colour of one of
the permitted arrangements, the Crown will have to prove either
actual undue lessening of competition or likelihood of such lessening.
Whereas, before the inclusion of the defences, the agreement itself,
as evidence of the intent to unduly lessen competition, would probably
have been sufficient, now, the agreement is only partial evidence of
the likelihood of undue lessening. And it is significant that, in the
two recent merger cases, the courts refused to consider evidence of
the intent of the accused in order to determine the likelihood of a
lessening of competition.' 8 It is quite possible that a similar view
may be adopted in combination cases, as well.
On the other hand, subsection (3) places special emphasis on one
aspect of competition, namely, freedom of entry into an industry,
which is not stressed in the main provision on combinations. Em-
phasis on this aspect (which is also indicated by the omission of
"unduly" with respect to it) was certainly needed. Still, the effect
of this provision is not very far reaching. If subsection (2) is not
16 Note that by virtue of the last head of §§ (2), any agreement in a form not explicitly
mentioned in §§ (3) is taken out of the general provision of §§ (1). See, on this point,
Brecher, supra note 2A, at 590.
17 Cf. Rex v. Container Materials Ltd., [1942] Can. Sup. Ct. 147, 159, per Kerwin J.;Regina v. No. Electric Co. Ltd., [1955] Ont. 431, 434. And cf. the relevant remarks of
M. Cohen, supra note 15, at 90-91.
18 Regina v. Can. Breweries Ltd., [1960] Ont. 601, 621; Regina v. B.C. Sugar Refining Co.
Ltd., (1960) 32 West. Weekly R. (n.s.) 577, 628.
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invoked or is not applicable, subsection (3) cannot be invoked or
applied, either. Therefore, the reference to freedom of entry in sub-
section (3) does not add another head to those in subsection (1).
The 1960 Amendments-Resale Price Maintenance
According to section 34 (2) it is a criminal offence for a dealer
to "require or induce" any other person to resell an article at a fixed
or minimum price, at a fixed or minimum markup, or at a fixed or
maximum discount. It is also unlawful for a dealer (section 34 (3))
to refuse to sell or supply an article on the grounds that the prospec-
tive buyer has refused to be bound by or has violated a resale price
maintenance arrangement. After the 1960 amendments, persons
accused under this section can raise certain defences. Where it has
been shown that a supplier has refused to sell to another person,
"no inference unfavourable to the person charged shall be drawn
from such evidence if he satisfies the court that he and any one
upon whose report he depended had reasonable cause to believe and
did believe" that the retailer was making a practice of using the
articles supplied as "loss-leaders" or in order to attract customers
to his store, or that he was making a practice of misleading advertis-
ing or of not providing to the customers a normal level of servicing
(section 34 (5)).
The new defences are limited in extent and are available only
under certain conditions. The existence of the practices listed does
not justify the accused in seeking to impose fixed resale prices. That
is to say, the defences of subsection (5) do not purport to allow
resale price maintenance. They only serve to negative the otherwise
clear inference that a refusal to sell, under certain conditions, was
an attempt at enforcing resale price maintenance (such refusal being
itself an offence under subsection (3)). Moreover, the onus of proof
of the defences rests squarely on the accused. He must satisfy the
court both that he had "reasonable cause to believe" and that he did
believe that the retailer was engaged in predatory practices. Also,
he must show that the retailer has been following a certain course
of conduct which can be called a "practice"; mere isolated instances
are not sufficient.
It is not very easy, therefore, for the accused to take advantage of
the defences. On the other hand, he does not have to show that the
retailer did in fact engage in the practices in question; only that he,
the accused, had reasonable cause to believe and did believe that he
did. Moreover, the content of the defences is not very definite.
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What constitutes loss-leadering or bait selling is by no means clear.
The Act defines loss-leadering as the use of the articles supplied "not
for the purpose of making a profit thereon but for purposes of ad-
vertising" (section 34(5) (b)), but these terms, too, need much
clarification. It should be recalled that one of the main conclusions
of the study of loss-leader selling which the Restrictive Trade Prac-
tices Commission had published in 1955, was that "loss-leadering"
is a term used in a variety of meanings, ranging from sale below
cost to any sale at a price not approved by the particular person
using the term. 19 With respect to the practice itself the report's con-
clusions were largely negative: it found a relatively low number of
instances of loss-leadering, and it considered that in most instances
what was involved was simply aggressive price competition. For
these and other reasons, the Commission recommended no special
remedial measures against loss-leader selling.
At the time of writing, only three cases of resale price main-
tenance had reached the courts (after 1960) and none of them
is yet reported. Two of these cases have resulted in acquittals, and in
at least one case the acquittal does not seem to have been founded
on section 34 (5).20 The other acquittal has been appealed by the
Crown.21 In the one case that led to a conviction, an unsuccessful
attempt to raise the defences of section 34(5) may have been made
by the accused. 22 A number of other cases will be probably reaching
the courts soon and in these the legal effect of the defences may be
tested. In one instance, the report of the Restrictive Trade Practices
Commission provides some interesting data on the interpretation of
the defences by some manufacturers as well as an indication of the
Commission's own construction.
Immediately after the enactment of the 1960 amendments, several
leading manufacturers of small electric appliances initiated a program
designed to induce distributors and retailers to observe minimum
"profitable" prices suggested by the manufacturers.23 In the case of
the Sunbeam Corporation (Canada) Ltd., the theory behind the
19 RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES CoM mssION [R.T.P.C.J, REPORT ON AN INQUIRY INTO Loss-
LEADER SELLING, 721, 241-242 (1955). And ef. R.T.P.C MATERIAL COLLECTED IN CON-
NECTION WrrH AN INQUIRY INTO LOSs-LEADER SELLING, (*1954).
20 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF INVESTIGATION AND RESEARCH, COMBINES INVESTIGATION ACT,
FOR THE YEAR ENDED MARCH 31, 1961, [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REPORT, followed by
the fiscal year] 36; and cf. D. H. W. Henry (Director of Investigation and Research,
Combines Branch), Unfair Distribution and Pricing Practices, LAW Soc'Y UPP. CAN.,
SPECIAL LECTURES--II TRADE COMPETITION AND THE LAW 1, 54-55 (1963).
21 See Henry, Ibid., ANNUAL REPORT 52 (1963).
22 Cf. Henry, ibid.
23 See The Globe & Mail, Mar. 13, 1961, p. 1 and Mar. 14, 1961, p. 1. More than one
manufacturer was mentioned in the newspaper reports, but at the time of writing only
one company has been the subject of a R.T.P.C. report; infra, note 24.
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program was that, if the retailers did not observe these minimum
prices (which were so calculated as to include a "reasonable" profit),
they were, "in the opinion" of the manufacturer, using the goods as
loss leaders. The Restrictive Trade Practices Commission did not
accept this construction of the Act.24 According to the Commission,
the Act requires that the manufacturer refusing to supply a retailer
must be convinced of the retailer's purpose in selling the goods at
the lower price (i.e., that he is selling not in order to make a profit
but for purposes of advertising.) Furthermore, since the specific
conditions of each enterprise differ considerably, it is not possible
for the manufacturer to establish one "minimum profitable resale
price" for all his retailers, on the basis of an "average cost of doing
business" and to maintain that any sale at a lower price is a sale
below cost. Finally, a "reasonable profit" cannot be determined in
the abstract for all retailers, since profit is a function of turnover as
well as markup and again there is no uniformity among retailers on
this score.24A The Commission also found that Sunbeam Corp. was
imposing a fixed resale price to its distributors as well as its retailers.
The Commission recommended that a court order be sought to
restrain Sunbeam from engaging in such practices. It will be very
interesting to see whether the courts will accept the Commission's
restrictive interpretation of the defences in section 34(5). If they
do, the ban on resale price maintenance will have lost very little
effect by the inclusion of these defences.
In the other reports of the Commission as well as the discon-
tinued inquiries of the Director of Investigation and Research, the
defences do not seem to be playing too important a role, although,
as is to be expected, they are often raised by the firms under in-
vestigation.
Recent Developments in the Administration of the Act
The enforcement of the Combines Investigation Act depends on
the effective coordination of governmental activities at three distinct
levels: first, at the "administrative" level, i.e., that of the Combines
24 R.T.P.C., REPORT CoNcERNiNo THE DisramurOx AND SALE oiz ELEcTRIc APPLIANCES,
ECRC SHAVERS AND ACCESSORY PRODUCTS (SUNBEAM CORPORATION (CANADA) LAITrr,
"10-77, (1962).
24A According to the newspaper reports, supra note 23, another manufacturer of electrical
appliances, Canadian General Electric, had instituted a programme similar to that of
Sunbeam, but, at the same time, it had "urged" any retailer who thought that he could
sell at a profit at prices lower than those suggested by the manufacturer to approach
the latter and discuss with it "his cost of operation and normal return of investment as
shown by financial reports, income tax statements etc., so that we may reach a mutual
understanding that the proposed lower prices are not, in fact, examples of loss leading."
This arrangement might have met the last two requirements of the Restrictive Trade
Practices Commission, if it did not place the "onus of proof" wholly on the retailer,
while the Act seems to place the onus as to his "belief' on the manufacturer.
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Branch and the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission;25 second,
at the political level, that of the Minister of Justice, the Cabinet and
Parliament; and third, at the judicial level, that of the courts which
may impose fines or jail sentences, and issue restraining or dissolution
orders. Ultimately, of course, the political level is the most im-
portant, since it has the power to set the rules which the administra-
tion and the courts will have to follow. 26 For present purposes, how-
ever, in order to study the specific function of each of these levels,
we may take as given the existence of the Act and its approximate
contents. Seen in this context, the pattern of application of the Act
up to now is clear: the officials at the administrative level are charged
with the initial investigations and with preparing the cases for the
Crown, those at the political level play a marginal (and very obscure)
role in bringing the cases before the courts, while the final decision
on each case is left to the courts, which are thus the only organs
charged with the direct enforcement of the Act.
It is not unfair to say that, chiefly because of the Act's criminal
character, the Canadian courts have been very strict in their construc-
tion and application of its provisions; in the final result, their case law
has limited the effectiveness of the Act. Apart from cases where pro-
cedural difficulties were involved,27 and without disregarding the in-
stances where some understanding of the purposes and problems of
the Act has been shown, it is true that the courts have in several in-
stances so construed the Act as to deprive it of any real effect; the
most recent examples are the Regina v. Morrey case28 and the two
mergers decisions. 29 In another recent case, the Supreme Court of
Canada held that the violation of the Act's provisions against price
discrimination is not in itself a sufficient cause of (civil) action on the
part of the aggrieved party, and that furthermore the presence of price
discrimination does not render unenforceable a previously con-
cluded contract. 30
25 It is true that, in establishing the present administrative arrangements, Parliament (which
was on this point implementing the MacQuaie Committee's report) intended that the
Combines Branch and the Commission should exercise distinct functions and keep distinct
personalities. In fact, the two have operated very closely together and are indistinguishable
as far as policy issues are concerned. And cf. Friedmann, Monopoly, Reasonableness and
the Public Interest In the Canadian Anti-Combines Law, 33 CAN. B. REv. 133, 154-162(1955); Cohen, supra note 15, at 89-90, 93.
26 Cf. RoSENBLUTrHl AND TnoRsunN 66-67.
27 Cf., e.g., Rex v. Ash-Temple Co., [1949] Ont. 315.
28 (1956) 6 D.L.R. 2d 114, 19 West. Weekly R. (n.s.) 299. And cf. RosENBLUTH AND
THORURN 69-70, and infra note 32.
29 Supra note 18. For some recent comments, see Sexton, Mergers Under Canadian Com-
bines Law, 2 WEST. L. REv. 1 (1962-63); Lyons, Recent Canadian Anti-Combines Policy:
Mergers and Monopoly, 15 U. ToRoNTo L. J. 155, 158-65 and passim (1963).
30 Direct Lumber Co. Ltd. v. Western Plywood Co. Ltd. [1962] Can. Sup. Ct. 646, 35
D.L.R. 2d 1, affirming (1962), 32 D.L.R. 2d 227. The court distinguished the case of
conspiracies to lessen competition, where the traditional (and ineffective) common law
rules will presumably apply. Cf. Henry, supra note 20, at 58-64.
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According to the same "traditional" pattern of action, those
charged with the administration of the Act have little or no power of
direct enforcement. In fact, they possess some power to exercise
psychological pressure; the initiation of an investigation, the publica-
tion of a report3' and the threat of prosecution under the Act can be,
and no doubt have been, used to induce compliance. Even toward the
courts, the administrators of the Act are not totally helpless. Like all
law enforcement officials, they have a margin of discretion: they may
choose for further investigation and eventually prosecution or appeal
the cases which appear most likely to result in convictions or in es-
tablishing that construction of the Act which is most helpful for its
enforcement. Accordingly, an outside observer may well disagree with
their decisions in particular matters, criticize them for not prosecuting
or not appealing in a particular case. On the whole, the anti-combines
administration seems to have been rather cautious in its relationship
with the courts, perhaps because of an exaggerated "legalistic" re-
spect for their authority. However, it should be kept in mind that,
first, there is in such matters considerable ground for disagreement,
even between experts, and, second, that these problems arise only
within a narrow margin of discretion. Once a final decision has been
rendered by the courts, the administrators of the Act are bound to
treat it as an authoritative formulation of the law.32
This pattern of application of the Combines Investigation Act
is the one that has been followed in the 'fifties and it is probably still
dominant. It is not, however, the only possible pattern under the Act,
and today one may discern the beginning of a movement away from
it, toward the adoption of a new and more complicated pattern, where
the direct enforcement of the Act is undertaken at the administrative
and political levels, as well, not only the judicial. It is probably too
early for an examination of the reasons for this change of approach. It
should be noted, however, that the emergence of this new pattern may
be due in part to the shock caused by the 1960 decisions on mergers,
which made necessary a reappraisal of policies and means.
31 RosamLurn AND THostauN, at 38-39, rightly point out that, for some years now, the
Reports' publication entails little publicity, i.e. no effort is made to attract the attention of
the public at large. Even so, one may wonder whether the value of publicity is not over-
rated. The existing evidence seems to indicate that only in a few cases (and then gen-
erally, in order to avoid further Government action) the publication of a report has led
to a change in the conduct of the persons under investigation. It certainly has not in
most of the highly publicized cases that have reached the courts. Compare, e.g., the
situation in the match industry as reviewed id. at 68-69 (situation unchanged after con-
viction) and that in the beer industry, Id. at 71 (further merger after acquittal).
32 The surprise expressed by RoSENBLUTH AND THOausRN, at 70, on the Director's "change of
opinion" after the Regina v. Morrey case, supra note 28, seems therefore unjustified. It
was the Director's duty to describe in his report the state of the law on the matter and
he did so. The question of the wisdom of the decision not to ask for a new trial is a
distinct issue.
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A first reaction to these decisions may be found in the annual
report of the Director of Investigation and Research for the fiscal year
1961. It was stated, in somewhat cryptic terms, that "the Director's
position concerning mergers generally has been reconsidered in the
light of" the two decisions, and that it was "considered" that the in-
quiries in progress should be completed and new ones undertaken
where necessary. 33 In subsequent public statements, the Director
made clear that he considered the two cases decided on their special
facts, namely, a finding of fact as to the existence of competition in
the B.C. Sugar case and, in the Beer case, a holding that, in view of
the existence of a provincial board charged with the regulation of the
brewing industry, price behavior has been removed from the area of
competition in that industry. 34 This position was confirmed by the Re-
strictive Trade Practices Commission in its Meat Packing report of
August 1961. The Commission further described the decisions as
resting on the "underlying assumption... that the remedies provided
in the legislation ... could only be applied where the merger being
questioned resulted in the merged companies obtaining a virtual
monopoly of the trade or industry, or being put in a position to ex-
ercise virtually complete control over the trade or industry." 35 The
Commission then suggested that the new definition of "merger" in the
1960 amendments removed any possible contention that such virtual
monopoly was necessary before an offence under the mergers pro-
vision could be found.
A year later, in its August 1962 Shipping Containers report, the
Restrictive Trade Practices Commission again dealt with the two
mergers decisions. 36 It emphasized that they had imposed a require-
ment of virtual monopoly and pointed out that this test is much stricter
than that laid down in the earlier judgments of the Supreme Court of
Canada with respect to combinations and agreements to lessen com-
petition. It went on to state that under such conditions, "it will be
very difficult indeed for the Crown ever to secure a conviction in a
merger case, unless, as a result of and flowing from the transaction,
the merger constitutes a complete or virtually complete monopoly in
the industry," and it expressed the hope that "in the near future the
questions raised by these decisions will be reviewed by appellate tri-
33 ANNUAL REPORT 14 (1961).
34 Cf. Henry, Address to the Montreal Economics Association, Oct. 17, 1961; Henry, supra
note 20 at 38, 39.
35 R.T.P.C. REPORT CONCERNING THE MEAT PACKING INDUSTRY AND THE ACQUIsmoN OF
WILSm LTD. AND CALGARY PACKERs LTD. BY CANADA PACKERS LTD. 429 (1961).
36 R.T.P.C. REPORT CONCERNING TIM MANUrFACrTURE, DisrUiBHmoN AND SALE Or PAPER-
BOARD SMIPPING CONTAINERS AND RELATED PRODUCTS 648-652, 656 (1962).
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bunals, more particularly by the Supreme Court of Canada, so that
they may be definitely settled." Partly because of this state of the law
and partly because of the complexity of the situation in the shipping
container industry, the Commission did not recommend action before
the courts for the dissolution of the mergers involved, though it
stated that this might be one solution of the problem. It suggested in-
stead, that the best long-range solution, in order to strengthen com-
petition in the industry, would be the elimination of tariff protection.3 7
The Shipping Containers report was not the first in which the Re-
strictive Trade Practices Commission recommended that action be
taken under the, until recently in disuse, 38 section of the Act which
provides for lowering or elimination of tariffs as a remedy against a
monopolistic situation. In its February 1959 report on the manufac-
ture, distribution and sale of ammunition, the Commission had pointed
out that in the absence of tariff protection, the sole Canadian manu-
facturer of ammunition would not be able to engage in the restrictive
distribution policies which he had been following. Since, however, that
manufacturer argued that the elimination of protective tariff would
put him out of business completely (given the size of the Canadian
market), the Commission suggested that the continuance of the tariff
be made conditional on his adopting non-restrictive practices.39 The
proposal was referred to the Ministers of Finance and of Trade and
Commerce for consideration, but no action was taken because the
manufacturer submitted proposals for the modification of his policies
in accordance with the Commission's recommendations and they were
accepted.40
Another provision of the Combines Investigation Act which has
received no application as yet is that of section 30, accrding to
which, where patents or trade marks are being used in a manner un-
duly restrictive of competition, the Attorney General of Canada may
request the Exchequer Court to declare void any related agreements,
restrain any person from implementing them, direct the grant of
compulsory licenses or even revoke the patent, or have the trade
mark expunged from the register. In no case has the Commission
suggested the use of these remedies in connection with an investiga-
37 Id. at 658-661. For a strong criticism, apparently made without benefit of reading § 19(3) and 29 of the Act, see The Toronto Globe & Mail, Aug. 31, 1962, p. 6, and Sept. 7,
1962, p. B-2.
38 Measures under this provision have been taken only once, at the turn of the century,
when following an investigation of the paper manufacturing industry by Mr. Jtic
Taschereau, a combination detrimental to the public was found to exist.
39 R.T.P.C. REPoRT CONCERNING THE MANUFACrURW, DISTRUTrIoN AND SALE OF AMMUNI-
TION IN CANADA 108 (1959).
40 ANNuAL RP Or 15-16 (1963).
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tion relating to a specific offence under the Act. Recently, however,
the question of the revocation or abolition of patents was raised in a
major report on the drug industry, undertaken under section 42 of the
Act, i.e., as a research inquiry into situations which, though possibly
not constituting offences under the Act, have restrictive features which
may affect the public interest.41 After suggesting various improve-
ments of the existing control of drugs by the Food and Drug Direct-
orate, the Commission states that the compulsory licensing provisions
of the Patent Act have proven insufficient to assure the supply of low
priced drugs and that the existence of patents on drugs has made it
possible to keep prices at a high level and has produced no benefits to
the Canadian public. The Commission therefore recommended the
abolition of patents with respect to drugs, holding that this is "the only
effective remedy to reduce the price of drugs in Canada." It remains
to be seen whether the Commission will be now more prepared to
suggest the use of this remedy in connection with specific situations.42
In closing this discussion on possible remedies, we should note
that the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission is currently attempt-
ing to test the attitude of the courts toward section 31(2) of the Act,
which provides for the issuance by a court of a restraining order or,
in the case of a merger, of an order for its dissolution where a court is
satisfied that it is needed, but before any conviction for an offence
under the Act and in the absence of any prosecution for such an
offence. The constitutionality of this provision has been placed in
doubt, since it may be considered as infringing the provincial legis-
latures' "property and civil rights" jurisdiction.43 It is interesting to
note that most of the cases in which the Commission is seeking an
order under section 31 (2) are relatively clear-cut cases of resale price
maintenance, where, moreover, it was found that the supplier in-
volved had pursued prohibited policies on a small scale because of
41 R.T.P.C. REPORT CONCERNING THs MANUFACTURE, DIsTRIBUTION AND SALE OF DRUGS
(January 1963).
42 In another recent report on an inquiry under § 42 of the Act, the Commission recom-
mended amendments to the Act to prohibit certain restrictive practices of wholesale
suppliers, such as exclusive dealing and tying arrangements, when they are likely to
lessen competition substantially, tend to create a monopoly or impede to a significant
degree the entry of competitors into the market. R.T.P.C. REPORT ON AN INQUIRY INTO
THE DISTRIBUTION AND SALE OF AUTOMOTIVE OILs, GREASES, ANTI-FREZE, ADDITIVES,
TIRES, BATTERIES, AccEssosS, AND RELATED PRODUCTS (March 1962). For a survey of
teh related legal problems, see ILnGout, CASES ON UNFAIR AND RES'sIcvavE TRADE
PRACTICES 366-371 (1962).
43 Cf. Cohen, supra note 15, at 95; GossE, op. cit. supra note 9, at 247. Section 31 (1) of
the Act which provides for a similar restraining or dissolution order to be issued after
conviction, as an additional penalty, has been found by the courts intra vires the
Dominion Parliament, Goodyear Tire Co. of Can. v. The Queen [1956] Can. Sup. Ct.
303, 2 D.L.R. 2d 11.
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pressures on the part of some of his dealers.44 The supplier may there-
fore be expected not to resist very strongly the Commission's action.
Once a restraining order in such a "clear" case is issued, the position
of the Commission in seeking a similar order in connection with, for
instance, a merger should be considerably strengthened.
Two other observations should be made with regard to the recent
activities of the Combines Branch of the Department of Justice. First,
there has been an increased emphasis on the investigation and eventual
prosecution of offences relating to "unfair" rather than "restrictive"
trade practices, such as price discrimination, predatory pricing and
misleading advertising.45 A considerable number of cases have come
up under these provisions and the Crown's record of convictions
seems somewhat better in these cases than it is in the combinations
and mergers cases. Most of the unfair trade cases, however, involve
relatively small scale problems and their total effect on the Canadian
economy is not very significant. Still, it appears that the unfair trade
provisions of the Act have aroused considerable interest in business
circles; thus, most of the talks and addresses that the Director of In-
vestigation and Research has been invited to give in the last three
years are focused on these provisions rather than on those relating to
combinations and mergers.
Another characteristic of the recent activities of the Combines
Branch has been its so-called "program of compliance," consisting of
increased efforts at informal consultation with business and increased
public discussion of the provisions of the Act and of the usefulness of
consultation. The Director of Investigation and Research when inviting
such consultation has always been very careful to point out that he
has no competence to "approve" or "disapprove" a given business ar-
rangement and that therefore any advice he gives is strictly unofficial
and non-binding.46 It would seem, however, that this increased em-
44 See R.T.P.C. REPORT CONCEmNG ALLEGED ATTEMPTS AT RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
IN TnE DIsTRIunON AND SALE OF CAMERAS AND RELATED PRODucTs (ARRow
PHOTOGRAPmIC EQUIPMENT LTD.) 42-43 (1961); R.T.P.C. REPORT CONCERNING ALLEGED
ATTEMPTS AT RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE IN THE DISTRIBUTION AND SALE OF CAMERAS
AND RELATED PRODUCS (GARLIcK FILMS LTD.) 43 (1961). According to the latest in-
formation available, restraining orders were issued in both cases. At the time of writing,
the possibility of seeking similar orders was being considered by counsel in another
resale price maintenance case (the Sunbeam case, supra note 24), one case of predatory
pricing (under § 33A (1) (b) of the Act) and in a major merger case (the "meat
packing" case, supra note 35); ANNuAL REPoRT APP. 1, at 61, 57 (1963).
45 While the first two of these offences have often been used as means for restricting com-
petition, misleading advertising appears totally unrelated to the Act's main object, the
preservation of free competition. The only reason it was included in the Act must have
been the wish to assure stringent enforcement by the Combines Branch.
46 Cf. Henry, supra note 20, at 2-5; also in various addresses, such as that of Nov. 6, 1962,
before the Canadian Manufacturers of Chemical Specialties Association, and that of Aug.
12, 1963, before the Canadian Pharmaceutical Association Inc.
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phasis on consultation is designed to circumvent, legally and within
strict limits, the restrictions imposed on the anti-combines administra-
tion by the criminal character of the legislation. Although the Com-
bines Branch cannot undertake a regulatory function and its advice
to businessmen is therefore not binding either on them or on itself,
such advice can be in fact of considerable importance in indicating to
businessmen whether their prospective action is likely to be considered
as constituting an offence under the Act. While there is no reason in
strict law why a businessman should seek the advice of the Combines
Branch or, once he has sought it, to follow it, it is obviously to his in-
terest in many cases to do so. There seems to be no way in which the
strict legality of the Branch's consultation procedure can be put to the
test and it remains to be seen how far this aproach can be carried and
to what extent it will be capable of increasing the effectiveness of the
Act.47
Concluding Observations
The recent developments in anti-combines administration make
evident that, however limited the present legislation may be, not all of
its capabilities have been explored as yet. Enforcement of the Com-
bines Investigation Act, as it now stands, through court action may
take the form of (a) criminal prosecution leading to a fine and/or a
restraining or dissolution order after conviction, (sections 32(1), 33
and 31 (1) of the Act); (b) proceedings for the issuance of a restrain-
ing or dissolution order, upon evidence of commission or likelihood of
commission of an offence under the Act and without prior conviction
(section 31(2)); and (c) request for the issuance by the Exchequer
Court of compulsory patent licenses, for the revocation of patents or
for other related action as specified in section 30 of the Act. Until re-
cently, only the remedies under (a) had been used or sought to be
used. These remedies have proven largely ineffective, in part because
of the attitude of the courts, but chiefly because their criminal charac-
ter deprives them of flexibility and because such remedies generally
fail to affect to any significant extent the economic factors behind com-
binations and monopolies. Today, one may note some attempt at a
diversification of remedies. Proceedings under section 31(2) of the
Act are being instituted and there is even a faint indication that the
47 The extent of such activities of the Branch cannot, of course, be calculated with any
precision. It is noteworthy, for instance, that in a great number of his talks and writings
e Director of Investigation and Research has dealt in considerable detail with the
problem of identical tenders, a question which has been dealt with only incidentally in
Restrictive Trade Practices Commission reports. See, e.g., ANNUAL REPoRT at 23-24
(1961); Henry, supra note 20, at 30-32; Henry, Address to Ontario Municipal Purchasing
Agents' Association, Aug. 27, 1963.
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Restrictive Trade Practices Commission may in the near future at-
tempt to have recourse to the remedies of section 30.
The Act has long provided for the possibility of using the tariffs
as a means for inducing compliance with anti-combines policies. But
it is only very recently that this provision was effectively used (in the
Ammunitions case) and that further use of it has been suggested.
This particular development is of special interest: not only does
it lead to further diversification of remedies, but it also tends to shift
part of the burden of the direct enforcement of the Act from the
courts to the officials at the "political" level. Another such shift may
ultimately result from the "program of compliance" currently being
pursued by the Combines Branch which seems to lead eventually to
the undertaking by the Branch itself of part of the responsibility for
the direct enforcement of the Act.
A new pattern of enforcement of the Combines Investigation Act
appears then to be emerging today. Though still at a very early stage
of development, it may eventually lead to greater variety in the
remedies, methods and organs of enforcement and thereby to more
flexibility and greater effectiveness in anti-combines administration.
It cannot be contested, however, that for a fully effective im-
plementation of the public policy of the protection of free competition,
radical changes to the existing legislation are necessary. The Act's
criminal law basis remains a serious obstacle, because it limits the
number and kinds of possible means of enforcement and affects ad-
versely the attitude of the courts and the public. Legislative provision
for civil law remedies, founded on the "trade and commerce" power
of Dominion Parliament, as well as a clear provision on the possibility
of civil action by private parties damaged by the restrictive practices
involved would constitute a much needed improvement. Moreover,
the still unclear language of the Act together with the 1960 amend-
ments of sections 32 and 34 and the courts' restrictive construction of
the mergers provision have seriously limited the scope of possible
action under the Act. A clarification of the Act's language concerning
mergers and the amendment or elimination of the defences added to
sections 32 and 34 are then indicated.
Another significant obstacle to effective enforcement is the "legal-
istic" approach of the courts and, to a less extent and mostly in re-
action to the courts, of the administrators of the Act. By a "legal-
istic" approach, we mean one characterized by an exclusive or domin-
ant concern with legislative language and problems of formal evidence
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and a corresponding disregard of the public policy issues involved and
of the economic aspects of the relevant situations. Now, it is certainly
true that, when dealing with legislation which attempts to regulate
private economic behaviour to conform with specific public policies,
the courts or the executive should be cautious and consistent. Certain
well-defined limits have to be set up in order to insure predictability
for the private citizens. But predictability is not the sole concern of the
law, it is but one of several operative public policy considerations,
the disregard for any of which is as reprehensible as the lack of
caution or consistency. More emphasis on the substantive aspects of
the problems arising out of anti-combines administration is needed.
There has been, since 1952, considerable increase and improvement
in the economic content of the reports of the Restrictive Trade Prac-
tices Commission, though they are still far from being models of econ-
omic analysis. The courts, however, have generally shown themselves
unconcerned with the economic aspects of the cases before them. They
have tended to disregard economic arguments in favour of a "strict"
approach, which is based in fact on "common sense" considerations of
doubtful validity.48 In this field, change is difficult to achieve by legis-
lative action alone; one can only hope that the courts themselves will
decide to put an end to their isolation from the facts and figures of
modem life.
Finally, the preservation of free competition is not a task that can
be delegated to a specific organ of the governmental machine and
thereafter ignored by the Government when deciding on other gen-
eral or specific economic policies. 49 What is most urgently needed,
therefore, is a basic commitment of the Canadian Government to a
policy of encouraging free competition, a commitment manifested not
only in the narrow field of the enforcement of the Combines Investi-
gation Act, but in governmental economic policy as a whole.
48 The treatment by the courts of the concept of "competition" is perhaps the most striking
example of a persistent refusal to consider economic issues. This refusal has often led
them to a limited and inadequate perception of the problems at hand. While admitting
obiter that not only price competition but also competition in quality or in other respects
are relevant and important (see e.g., Rex v. McGavin Bakeries Ltd. (No. 6) (1951),
[19521 1 D.L.R. 201, 215; Regina v. No. Electric Co. Ltd., supra note 17, at 443-444),
the courts have consistently used price competition as the sole test in determining
whether any "undue" lessening of competition has taken place; see, e.g., Rex. v.
McGavin Bakeries Ltd., supra; Regina v. Can. Breweries Ltd., supra note 18, at 610, 624,
630; Regina v. B.C. Sugar Refining Co. Ltd., supra note 18, at 586, 633. A more realistic
approach (and a sounder one, from an economic point of view) would have helped im-
measurably in clarifying the issues. And see also Kilgour, Comment, 35 CAN. B. REV.
1087, 1099 (1957).
49 Among many others, see RosENsLUrH AND THoRBURN 105; PAPANDREOU AND WHEELER,
COMPETITION AND ITS REGULATION 482-483, 489 (1954); MASSEL, Com:ssTToN AND
MONOPOLY-LEGAL AND ECONOMIC IssuEs 42-82 (1962).
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